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Abstract
I test the Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2002) hypothesis that security prices
incorporate expected future securities lending income. To determine whether
institutional investors anticipate gains from future lending of securities, I ex-
amine their trading behavior around loan fee increases. The evidence suggests
that institutions buy shares in response to an increase in lending fees and that
this could explain the premium associated with high lending fee stocks. Ex-
pected future lending income affects stock prices, although the effect seems to
be attenuated by the negative information that arises from short selling.
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I Introduction
The securities lending market has grown dramatically in the past decade. In July 2008,
the New York Stock Exchange reported of a peak short interest of 18.6 million shares,
equal to 4.7% of total shares outstanding. In that same year, the balance of securities
on loan in the U.S. grew to $685 billion, according to Data Explorers’ securities lending
yearbook.
Figure 1 plots the average equal-and value-weighted annualized loan fees and loan
quantities for stocks from June 2006 through December 2008. Average loan spreads
widened from an average of 20-30 basis points (bp) (80 bp equally weighted) in 2006, to
over 100 (350 equally weighted) at the height of the 2008 crises.1 The number of shares
borrowed relative to shares outstanding reached a maximum of 3.1% in 2008 (5.4% on
an equally weighted basis).
The business of securities lending became lucrative business for funds with large
portfolios of stocks. Dimensional Fund Advisors, for example, earned $182 million in net
lending revenue for fiscal year 2008. According to Data Explorers Ltd, U.S. investment
companies earned almost $1.5 billion overall in 2008 from lending securities.
When they lend shares to short sellers, institutional investors benefit by receiving
lending income. I examine whether security prices incorporate this future expected
1Securities lending involves the temporary transfer of securities by a lender to a borrower. The borrower is required
to provide collateral to the securities lender in the form of cash or other securities. Legal title passes on both sides of
the transaction so that borrowed securities and collateral can be sold or re-lent. Borrowers are typically required to post
collateral of 102 to 105 cents per dollar of security, beyond the 50% margin when the lender is a U.S. broker-dealer; see
D’Avolio (2002) for more details. Loan income can be economically significant. Lending returns are comprised of the
securities lending (fee) return and the reinvestment on the cash collateral. If the borrower provides securities as collateral
to the lender, he pays a fee to borrow the securities. If the borrower provides cash as collateral, the lender pays interest to
the borrower (the rebate rate) and reinvests the cash at the current short-term interest rate. The fee is then the difference
between the short-term rate and the rebate rate, expressed in basis points per year. Note the growth in the security
lending market was much less in 2012-2013.
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lending income. Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2002) predict that investors are willing
to pay more than their valuation of the share, if they expect to profit from lending in
the future when the opportunity arises. The stock price will reflect the expected future
income associated with the potential of lending the asset. The prospect of lending fees
increases prices beyond even the most optimistic buyer’s valuation of the security’s future
dividends.
Yet, the fact that there is excess demand for shorting can imply that there is negative
information that is not yet incorporated into prices. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987)
argue that, given that sale proceeds cannot be reinvested, and the additional cost of
borrowing securities to short, short sellers are likely to be informed investors. Empirical
tests corroborate the information content of shorts as future returns are predictably low
when short sale volume is high.2 Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004), Christophe, Ferri,
and Hsieh (2010), Karpoff and Lou (2010), and Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2011)
find direct evidence that short sellers actually anticipate earnings surprises, financial
misconduct, and analyst downgrades. Anticipated lending income means that the same
signal that exerts upward pressure on price, also exerts downward pressure, due to
the implied negative information. The outcome of these two competing effects is an
empirical question. I address whether institutional investors anticipate lending income
and are willing to pay a premium for stocks in which they expect high lending fees.
Both the theoretical and empirical literature agree that short selling frictions have
important implications for asset prices. At the same time, there is no consensus as to
the source of price inflation associated with short sale constraints, such as the presence
of a high borrowing fee. Disagreement models like Miller (1977) attribute price inflation
2Brent, Morse, and Stice (1990); Senchank and Starks (1993); Aitkan, Frino, McCorry, and Swan (1998); Dechow,
Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan (2001); D’Avolio (2002); Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran (2002); Geczy,
Musto and Reed (2002); Jones and Lamont (2002); Angel, Christophe and Ferri (2003); Lamont (2004); Asquith, Pathak,
and Ritter (2005); Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006); Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008); Diether, Werner, and Lee
(2009); and Boehmer, Huszár, and Jordan (2009) show that short sales predict abnormally low future returns.
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to the optimism of the marginal investors. Any restriction would lead the price to
be set by the most optimistic buyers, as short sales, in the presence of divergence of
opinions effectively increase the supply of shares, thereby correcting the exuberant but
downward-sloping demand.
In static models, the price is as high as the valuation of the most optimistic investors
(e.g., Miller (1977), and Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002)). In a dynamic setting, short sale
constraints can cause prices to be higher than the valuation of all investors. In Harrison
and Kreps’ model (1978), differences of opinion, together with short sale constraints,
create a speculative premium.3
Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2002) present a dynamic model of asset valuation in
which short selling requires searching for security lenders and bargaining over the lending
fee. Search frictions allow for lender expropriation, and the expectation of lending fees,
in turn, increases the equilibrium price. This suggests that price inflation could represent
a capitalization of future lending income. In the Treasury repo market, Duffie (1996)
shows that special repo rates increase the equilibrium price of the underlying instrument.
Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2002) extend the theoretical relation to equity and
fixed-income security lending. This paper builds on the theoretical research of Duffie,
Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2002) by investigating empirically whether security prices in
the equity market incorporate prospective security lending income.
In this paper, several empirical findings suggest that institutions respond to increases
in lending fees and that their trading behavior contributes to the overvaluation of high
fee stocks. In a univariate analysis, I observe an increase in institutional ownership and
number of institutions investing in a stock two quarters before and after it becomes
expensive to borrow. The average inventory levels in these stocks increases two quarters
before the fee reaches the threshold level, and this trend continues in the following
3According to Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) this speculative premium leads
to high turnover, overpricing, and even to bubbles.
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quarters. There is no such similar trend in the stocks that are not expensive to borrow.
I also observe an increase in the number of stocks on loan in the quarters following the
high fee, suggesting that the increased inventory translates in part into loans. Moreover,
the actual fee on high fee stocks decreases sharply, in accordance with an increase in
supply.
Impulse-response functions following a panel VAR show that a one standard de-
viation increase in the lending fee increases institutional ownership by 0.50% and the
number of institutions holding the stock by 0.90% in the following quarter.
I find that institutions tend to buy shares in response to an increase in lending
fee. An observed increase in lending fee for a stock makes institutions 1.33 times more
likely to buy. Institutions also respond to the predictable component in lending fees,
suggesting they actually anticipate lending income.
I also examine the security lending practices of mutual funds in particular and find
the aggregate lending income to be an important predictor of whether a mutual fund
will allow security lending. Mutual funds are also two times more likely to increase their
holdings in a stock if the stock has experienced an increase in lending fee, suggesting
that mutual funds could be buying high fee stocks for the purpose of lending.
Most importantly, the overvaluation associated with high lending fees is most pro-
nounced among stocks that institutional investors are trading in the direction of the high
fee possibly to gain lending income. For example, among stocks with intense institutional
trading, the contemporaneous average four-factor alpha spread between high and low fee
stocks is 2.78% per month (t-statistic=3.52). Among stocks with low institutional trad-
ing, the contemporaneous risk-adjusted return spread between high and low fee stocks
is actually negative and statistically significant. When including firm level controls in
a Fama-Macbeth specification the contemporaneous difference in risk-adjusted return
between a top fee quintile stock that is bought by institutional investors and a high fee
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stock that is not bought by institutions is 2.64% per year. This suggests that institu-
tional investors tend to trade in the direction of high expected lending income and that
those trades contribute to the premium on high fee stocks. These results are consistent
with a view that institutional investors are willing to pay a premium for high fee stocks
and that future lending income is capitalized into prices.
I also find that institutions are less willing to purchase shares that experienced both
an increase in borrowing cost and negative earnings news. The results seem to suggest
that there is a trade-off between lending income and the implied negative information
from short selling. Moreover, the premium for high fee stocks is insignificant in the
subsample of stocks that experience a negative information shock.
These findings combined are consistent with institutional investors realizing the ad-
vantages of security lending and that the expectation of lending income contributes to
some of the overvaluation of high fee stocks.
My results have important implications for the literature on equity lending. The
balancing out of the two forces, capitalized lending income and the negative information
inherent in short selling, could explain why Kaplan, Moskowitz, and Sensoy (2012) find
that although making securities available for lending is profitable, it does not affect the
price of the underlying securities. The capitalization of lending income can also explain
the pricing differences among various measures of short sale constraints. Lending income
could explain Boehmer, Huszár, and Jordan’s (2009) finding that stocks with low short
interest experience positive abnormal returns, given that D’Avolio (2002) shows that
the mean loan fee is also high in the first short interest portfolio decile. Especially
when considering that for the low short interest decile there is high potential for lending
in the future. Similarly, the capitalization of lending income can explain the finding of
Autore, Boulton, and Braga-Alves (2010) that stocks reaching threshold levels of failures
with low short interest become more overvalued than threshold stocks with high short
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interest. My results show that institutional investors seem to respond to an increase
in expected lending income, when the expectation is formed using signals from publicly
available failure-to-deliver data.
This work contributes to the literature on short sale constraints and valuation.
Seneca (1967), Miller (1977), Harrison and Kreps (1978), Figlewski (1981), and Morris
(1996), among others, argue that security prices are upward biased when there are short
sale constraints because negative information is not fully incorporated into prices. My
results suggest that short selling constraints can cause prices to deviate from the intrinsic
value due to the capitalization of future lending income. The tendency of institutional
investors to trade in the direction of high expected lending income exacerbates the price
overreaction, thereby contributing to the premium on high fee stocks. To the best of
my knowledge, I am the first to show empirically that future lending expectation affects
current stock prices and that the extent of this effect arises from a trade-off between
negative information and security lending income.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data and the summary
statistics. Section III reports the univariate results on the response of institutional
investors to an increase in lending fee and Section IV the multivariate analysis. In
Section V, I test whether institutional investors are willing to pay a premium for high
fee stocks. Section VI documents a trade-off between lending income and the implied
negative information from short selling. Section VII examines the security lending and
portfolio decision of mutual funds. Section VIII includes a robustness check of the
results, and Section IX concludes.
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II Data
The data for this study come from various sources. I obtain quarterly institutional
holdings for all common stocks from the Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum database
of Securities and Exchange Commission 13F filings. Institutional ownership for each
stock is defined as the number of shares held by institutional investors divided by the
total number of shares outstanding.4 I exclude observations with total institutional
ownership greater than 100%. Stock return, share price, number of shares outstanding,
and turnover data come from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for
all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks and the book value of equity and dividends from
COMPUSTAT. S&P500 constituent data is from the COMPUSTAT annual updates in-
dex constituents. The information on earnings and surprises comes from the unadjusted
surprise history file in I/B/E/S.
The security lending data are from Data Explorers Ltd., which collects data from
custodians and prime brokers that lend and borrow securities. The data include daily
stock-level information on the loan fee, the borrowed amount, and the dollar value and
quantity of shares available for lending. This covers the equity lending supply, loan
prices, and quantities for 4,393 U.S. firms from June 2006 through December 2008.
While the sample period is short, it does coincide with the two years when security
lending activity and income reached their highest levels. I supplement the loan data
with short interest data from Short Squeeze and with failure-to-deliver records from the
SEC. Failure-to-deliver data include the total number of fails-to-deliver (i.e., the balance
level outstanding) recorded in the National Securities Clearing Corporation’s (NSCC)
Continuous Net Settlement (CNS) system aggregated over all NSCC members.5
4This represents the long institutional ownership, not net institutional ownership of a stock.
5Available at http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/failsdata.htm, Data prior to September 16, 2008, include only securities
with a balance of total fails-to-deliver of at least 10,000 shares as of a particular settlement date. Data after that date
include all securities with a balance of total fails-to-deliver as of a particular settlement date.
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My main tests use quarterly and monthly data. For the quarterly institutional
ownership trading tests, because institutional ownership data are reported quarterly, I
compute quarterly averages of equity lending variables for each stock. Since I calculate
the change in fee, I lose the third quarter of 2006. The final merged sample covers
30,642 firm-quarter observations for 4,040 stocks. In the second set of tests, I examine
whether the monthly overvaluation associated with the presence of high fees is more
pronounced among stocks that institutions are trading in the direction of the increasing
borrowing cost. There are again 4,040 stocks in the sample for a total of 66,011 firm-
month observations.
Table 1 shows summary statistics. Panel A reports the number of observations (N),
means, medians, standard deviations (Stdev), and quartile distributions (25%, 75%) of
the variables. The average institutional ownership (IO) in the sample of common equity
stocks is 54.24%, representing 140 institutional investors, on average (NIO). The average
annualized fee (Fee) over the sample period is 0.99%. The loan fee increased for about
35% of the stocks, although the average change in fee is a reduction of 1 basis point.
On average 4.20% of the shares outstanding are borrowed (On Loan), and the average
short interest (SIR) is 4.07%.
Panel B reports the differences between the stocks with fees below and above 1%,
a threshold used by D’Avolio (2002) and Prado, Saffi, and Sigurdson (2012) to classify
stocks as on special. The stocks with high fees (above 1%) differ significantly from the
low fee stocks. Most notably, the average institutional ownership of the top fee quintile
is significantly lower than that of the low fee stocks, 36.81% versus 62.76%. This is in
line with D’Avolio (2002) and Nagel (2005), who show that stock loan supply tends to
be scarce and short selling more expensive when institutional ownership is low. The
average annual fee is 4.26% for the top fee stocks, a number similar to D’Avolio (2002)
who documents a value-weighted average fee of 4.30% for stocks on special. Moreover,
8
stocks in the high fee group are shorted more, have lower inventory, both in number
of accounts and in levels (and therefore also higher utilization rates), are smaller, have
higher turnover, are more volatile, and have lower returns.
III Univariate Results
In Figure 2, I use the same 1% threshold of when a stock becomes expensive to
borrow of D’Avolio (2002) and Prado, Saffi, and Sigurdson (2012), and examine the per-
centage change in institutional ownership two quarters before and after a stock reaches
the threshold level.6 The top two panels show the percentage change of institutional
ownership for stocks with short selling fees above 1% (left) and the below 1% (right)
two quarters before and two quarters after classification at time t. Institutions are in-
creasing their positions in both high and low fee stocks prior to time t, but this effect
is much larger for the high fee stocks. Interestingly, in the high fee stocks institutions
continue to increase their holdings in these high fee stocks in the quarters following the
stock becoming special. Institutional ownership increases 7.4% in the two quarters after
reaching the fee level 1%, from 36.81 to 39.57 percentage points. This increase pertains
only to the high fee stocks, as there is no increase in institutional ownership in the re-
maining stocks (right). In fact, there appears to be a decline of 3.5% in institutional
ownership in the following 2 quarters in stocks whose fees are not above 1% at time t.7
A similar trend is visible in the number of institutional investors holding each stock.
The bottom two panels in Figure 2 show the percentage change in the number of insti-
tutional investors holding stocks with lending fees above 1% (left) and stocks with fees
below that level (right) two quarters before and two quarters after classification at time
t. The number of institutions holding the high fee stocks increases from 59, on average
6A similar pattern arises when looking at the top quintile of fee stocks.
7In unreported results the average institutional ownership change around high fees is significantly higher for stocks
held mostly by funds that allow security lending versus stocks held mostly by mutual funds that are not allowed to lend.
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at time t, to 64 and 70 in the next two quarters, an increase of 18.6%. In the low fee
stocks, the average number of institutions investing in those shares actually drops 6.7%
from 179 to 167 in the following two quarters. This univariate analysis suggests that a
high fee sparks the interest of institutional investors.
To determine whether institutional investors are buying the high fee stocks for the
purpose of lending to short sellers, I examine the change in average fee, the inventory,
loan quantities, and utilization of stocks two quarters before and after a stock reaches
the threshold level of fees of 1% in Figure 3. For stocks that are expensive to borrow,
the average fee (top left graph) decreases by 190 and 49 basis points following a peak at
time t in the following two quarters, a finding consistent with the idea that institutional
ownership translates into an increase in supply which in turn decreases the loan fee.
In effect, the average inventory levels relative to shares outstanding (top right graph)
already start to increase two quarters before the fee reaches the threshold level, and this
trend continues in the following quarters. There is no such similar trend in the stocks
that are not expensive to borrow. I also observe an increase in the number of stocks on
loan in the quarters following the high fee (bottom left graph). Although the increase
is not that large relative to shares outstanding, it suggests that the increased inventory
translates in part into loans. Moreover, I do not observe an increase in loan quantities
for the stocks with lower lending fees. In terms of utilization (bottom right graph), the
value of assets on loan relative to the lendable asset value, the increased inventory leads
to a reduction in utilization and the increased loan quantities to an increase, so the net
effect is no significant change in utilization for the high fee stocks.
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IV Institutional Trading in Response to an Increase in Lending
Fee
In this section I test whether an increase in borrowing charges triggers the interest of
institutional investors, by examining how an increase in lending fee influences changes
in institutional holdings. To explain the joint relation of institutional ownership and
the loan fee, I use a first-order panel vector autoregression approach (PVAR).8 This is a
multivariate simultaneous equation system that treats all variables as endogenous, while
allowing for unobserved stock heterogeneity, using the Blundell and Bond (1998) system
GMM dynamic panel instrumental-variables (IV) estimation.9 The estimator relies on
first-differences to eliminate unobserved stock-specific effects and then uses lagged levels
and difference values of the endogenous variables as instruments for subsequent first-
differences.10
First, to capture institutional ownership trading as a function of the fee, I specify a
first-order VAR model as follows:11
yi,t = Υ0 + Υ1yi,t−1 + fi + dt + εi,t (1)
where yi,t is a vector including the change in institutional ownership (∆ IO), and the
annualized lending fee in Panel A. In Panel B, I include the quarterly stock return to
control for changes in stock price, which might lead to changes in short sellers’ demand
and in turn lending fees and institutional ownership. fi introduces stock fixed effects
and dt period-specific time dummies. In Panel C and D, the yi,t vector includes changes
8The estimation is implemented using a PVAR routine by Inessa Love. See Love and Zicchino (2006) for computational
details.
9The Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM, outlined by Arellano and Bover (1995) and fully developed by Blundell
and Bond (1998), is an augmented version of the Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator.
10First differences are used as instruments in the levels equation, lagged levels are used to instrument in the first
difference equation.
11The lag length was selected following the AIC.
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in the natural log of one plus the number of institutional investors (∆ln(1+NIO)). Panel
C is the two-variable panel VAR, while Panel D includes the stock return. The results
are in Table 2.12
There is a positive relation between the lagged annualized fee and changes in in-
stitutional ownership (Panel A). An increase in institutional ownership in turn reduces
the lending fee. The results are even stronger when controlling for lagged stock returns
(Panel B). An increase in the fee leads to an increase in the number of institutions
holding the stocks (Panel C and D).
The impulse-response functions in Figure 4 further describe the reaction of institu-
tional investor ownership changes to the innovations in the lending fee, while holding all
other shocks at zero. A one standard deviation shock in the fee increases institutional
investor ownership by 0.50% (top right graph) in the following quarter. Consistent with
findings of Prado, Saffi, and Sturgess (2012), the fee in itself drops significantly with
an increase in institutional ownership as the supply of shares increases (top left graph).
The bottom graphs show the reaction of the change in the number of institutions hold-
ing the stock to a one standard deviation shock to the fee (bottom right graph) and
the reaction of the fee to a one standard deviation shock to the change in the number
of institutional holdings (bottom left graph). A one standard deviation increase in the
fee increases the number of institutional investors by 0.90% in the following quarter. A
standard deviation increase in the number of institutions in turn reduces the lending fee
by 8 basis points. The results are similar when I use a dummy variable to indicate the
presence of a high fee in the previous quarter or an increase in lending fee. Figure 1 in
the appendix shows the impulse response graphs for the reaction of both institutional
ownership changes and the change in the number of institutions to the presence of a
12The particular ordering of the specification is important. The variables that appear earlier in the system are assumed
to be more exogenous while the later ones are assumed to be more endogenous. Nonetheless, the results are robust to
changes in the order.
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high fee or fee increase.
Next I examine how an increase in lending fee influences institutional trading in a
fixed effects panel regression. The specification is:
Tradingi,t = αi + αt + β1Fee increasei,t + β2ln(Mcap)i,t + β3Bid− Aski,t
+β4Turnoveri,t + β5Pricei,t + β6S&P500i,t + β7Agei,t
+β8Stdevi,t + β9Reti,t−1 + β10MTBi,t + β11Dividendi,t + εi,t (2)
where the dependent variable is the change in institutional ownership (∆ IO) or changes
in the natural log of one plus the number of institutional investors (∆ln(1+NIO)) in
stock i at time t. I also run the specification with the dependent variable in levels,
IOi,t, the level of institutional ownership in stock i at time t and the natural log of
1 plus the number of institutional investors, ln(1+NIO). Fee increasei,t is a dummy
variable that equals one if the average quarterly lending fee on the stock has increased
over the previous quarter. Following Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Yan and Zhang
(2009), I include the stock characteristics firm size (Mcap) (the natural log of equity
market capitalization), past quarterly return (Reti,t−1), Price, Age, S&P index inclusion
(S&P500i,t), and volatility (Stdevi,t) to control for the common determinants of insti-
tutional holdings. To control for liquidity and transaction costs, I include the bid-ask
spread (Bid − Aski,t) and Turnover, which also accounts for differences in opinions as
in Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006).13 I include market-to-book value (MTB) as
research by Jiang (2009) shows that institutions trade in the direction of intangible in-
formation inherent in the book-to-market ratio. Dividendi,t is an indicator variable that
equals one if the stock pays a dividend as reported in Compustat. Finally, to control for
the visibility of stocks I include NumAnalyst, which is the number of analysts following
the stock, as reported in the unadjusted surprise history file in I/B/E/S, where missing
13The results are robust to the inclusion of analyst dispersion, but this limits the sample size to only the largest stocks.
13
values are set to zero. The regression includes year and stock fixed effects. Robust stan-
dard errors are clustered by stock to account for within-firm serial correlation. Lastly, I
examine whether institutional investors buy a stock in a fixed effects logit specification
with the same control variables (Controlsi,t), where a buy (buyi,t) is a dummy variable
equal to one when institutional investors increase their holdings in the stock.








where αi introduces stock fixed effects and αt period-specific time dummies.
The first two columns in Table 3 the dependent variable is the level of institutional
ownership and the log of one plus the number of institutional investors. Column 1, show
that in line with Yan and Zhang (2009) institutions prefer to hold larger stocks, stocks
with higher turnover, and stocks with lower MTB ratios. Consistent with the findings
in Gompers and Metrick (2001), the coefficient on past return is significantly negative.
Institutions also prefer dividend-paying stocks, as the coefficient of the dividend-paying
dummy is positive and significant.
Column 2 shows that larger, higher priced stocks, dividend paying stocks, and stocks
that are younger and more volatile are held by a higher number of institutional investors.
Institutions also seem to prefer stocks that have seen lending fees rise. As we see in
the table, stocks with increases in borrowing costs have a 0.98% higher institutional
ownership (column 1), and 1.89% more institutions hold the stock (column 2), in terms of
levels. Columns 3-5 describe the trading behavior of institutional investors. Institutions
tend to trade larger and less volatile stocks, which have seen their returns decrease.
More important, an increase in lending fees is associated with an increase of 0.89%
in institutional ownership and 1.40% more institutions holding the stock. Column 5,
reports the odds following the panel logit regression of the likelihood of buying a stock.
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Stocks that experience an increase in lending fees are 1.33 times more likely to be bought
by institutional investors.
A The Expected Future Lending Income
To determine whether institutional investors anticipate lending income and trade
in the direction of high expected lending fees, I first predict an increase in lending
fee as a function of publicly available information and stock characteristics and study
the relation between expected lending income and institutional ownership. A second
prediction includes proprietary information on inventory and loan values as reported by
Data Explorers, which more institutions are starting to subscribe to.
An important determinant of short sale fees is the frequency of so-called failure-to-
deliver occurrences within a quarter. At the time a short position is initiated, the short
seller has three days to locate and borrow the shares from a securities lender. Short
sellers that have not located shares from owners by that time are said to have failed-
to-deliver; see Evans, Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2009) for details. According to Blocher,
Reed, and Van Wesep (2012) the failure-to-deliver list attracts investors’ attention and
signals an increased likelihood that stocks may be becoming special. I use the failure-
to-deliver data to test whether an increase in expected borrowing fees would trigger the
interest of institutional investors and prompt their increased ownership. The advantage
of using the cumulative occurrence of a failure to determine whether security lenders
discount expected lending income in their valuation is that it is public information.14
In the second prediction I add utilization, which is the value of assets on loan from
beneficial owners (beneficial owner value on loan) relative to the total lendable asset
value (beneficial owner inventory value) from Data Explorers. In both predictions I also
include common short sale determinants. Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan (2001)
14The results are robust to exclusion of the failure occurrence variable.
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show that short sellers position themselves in stocks with low ratios of fundamentals to
market values, so as before I include the market-to-book (MTB) ratio. I include the
standard deviation of returns and turnover, similar to Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu
(2006), as a measure of divergence of opinion, as the heterogeneity of beliefs about a
firms fundamentals is expected to be related to the degree of short selling (Miller, 1977).
Diether, Lee, and Werner (2008) show that short sellers position themselves in stocks
with positive returns, and therefore I include past quarterly return. Additional costs to
short sellers are dividend payments, because stock prices tend to fall by less than the
amount of the dividend the short seller is required to reimburse, which could lead to a
lower lending fee. I therefore include an indicator of whether the stock pays dividends.
Other stock characteristics included are size, age, S&P 500 indicator, bid-ask spread,
and the price level.
In Table 4, the first two columns in the left-hand panel show the predictive regres-
sions, and columns 1-6 in the right-hand panel are the panel regressions of institutional
trading on the predicted fee. The two stages are estimated simultaneously to adjust the
standard errors in the second stage for the estimation error in the first stage.
The first columns in Table 4 show that failure-to-deliver is an important determinant
of the actual lending fee. A failure-to-deliver increases the likelihood of a fee increase.15
An increase in predicted fee leads to a much stronger response in institutional owner-
ship than the actual fee change (column 1, right panel). An increase in expected lending
fee increases institutional ownership of stocks by 5.95% and numbers of institutions in-
crease by 11.58%. Institutional investors are 1.24 times more likely to buy shares of
stocks whose lending fee they expect to increase. Institutional investors respond more
to the expected fee than an actual fee increase, suggesting that they buy stocks in antici-
pation of lending income in the future when the opportunity to lend arises. Institutional
investors respond slightly less to the predicted fee when we include proprietary informa-
15The results are similar when predicting the actual fee level.
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tion in the prediction regression (column 2), but the response is still greater than to the
actual fee increase.
V The Price of Prospective Lending
Next I test whether the overvaluation associated with high fees is more pronounced
among stocks that institutions are trading. I perform a monthly Fama-MacBeth (1973)
analysis and a two-way (5x5) independent portfolio sort of institutional trading and
lending fee to test whether there is a higher premium on high fee stocks, measured as
the difference in returns between high and low fee stocks, in stocks with high levels of
institutional trading.
First, in Figure 5, I rank stocks into five groups on the basis of the amount of
trading (i.e. change in institutional ownership in each quarter) and calculate for each
group the average change in fee in basis points. As we see in the top graph, the stocks
with the highest increase in institutional ownership also have on average increasing
lending fees, while the sold stocks have seen lending fee declines. The bottom graph
clearly distinguishes the direction of the trade, with the sample partitioned into buy or
sell, an increase or decline in institutional ownership, respectively. The figure shows that
institutions tend to sell stocks with declining lending fees and buy stocks with increasing
lending fees.
In Table 5 I perform a portfolio analysis, sorting each stock into fee and institutional
trading quintiles. The first two quintiles represent an average decrease in ownership and
as of quintile 3 the average change is an increase in holdings, which is increasing in
quintiles 4 and 5. The premium on high fee stocks, the difference in returns between
high and low fee stocks, is positive and significant only for stocks that are highly bought
by institutional investors. On a raw return basis, the top fee and institutional trading
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quintile has a positive return of 1.08%. The difference in contemporaneous raw returns
between the high fee stocks in the highest institutional trading quintile and the lowest fee
stocks is 2.23%. This difference cannot be explained by one-factor, or four-factor model
so the risk-adjusted premium on the high fee stocks is more than 2.75% per month. The
premium difference between high and low fee stocks that are bought by institutional
investors versus the ones that are sold is 5.99%. These results are consistent with the
premise that institutional investors trade in the direction of high fees to gain lending
income, thereby contributing to the overvaluation of high fee stocks.
I also perform a Fama-MacBeth (1973) analysis that allows for the inclusion of
additional stock level controls. I control for size, market-to-book, liquidity as measured
by bid-ask spread and turnover, the number of analysts following the stock and two
dummy variables that equal one when a stock pays a dividend or is in the S&P 500 index.
I classify stocks as Special if they are in the top 20% of the fee distribution. I interact
this indicator variable with another indicator variable that equals one if institutional
investors purchase the stock, to test whether the high premium on high fee stocks versus
low fee stocks is higher when the stocks are acquired by institutional investors.
As can be seen from the results in Table 6, column 1, a stock in the top fee quintile
does not trade at a premium in itself, as indicated by a negative coefficient on the
indicator variable special. The positive and statistically significant interaction term of
the Specialt and Buyt shows that the overvaluation is present solely for stocks that are
bought by institutional investors. The difference in risk-adjusted return between a stock
that is bought by institutional investors and is in the top 20% of the fee distribution
and a top fee quintile stock that is not bought by institutions is 2.64% (0.22 × 12) per
year.
In column 2, I interact the special indicator variable with another indicator variable
that equals one if institutional investors purchased the stock in the previous quarter
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(Buyt−1) to test whether institutional trading behavior contributes to the overvaluation
associated with high fees. The univariate and multivariate analyzes show that institu-
tions position themselves into stocks already one quarter before the stock is classified as
expensive. Specifically I am interested to see whether stocks that have been bought by
institutions in the previous quarter, to possibly gain lending income, subsequently trade
at a premium when the stock becomes expensive to borrow. Moreover, by lagging the
institutional ownership trade variable I avoid the contemporaneous price impact associ-
ated with the purchase of the share by the institution. The difference in risk-adjusted
return between a high-fee stock that was bought by institutional investors in the pre-
vious quarter and a top fee quintile stock that was not bought by institutions is 4.32%
(0.36 × 12) per year.
In column 3, I study the relation between expected lending income and returns. I
predict the lending fee as a function of publicly available information (as in the first stage
of Table 4) and test whether the premium on high expected fee stocks (the difference in
returns between high expected and low expected fee stocks) is positive and significant
for stocks that have been bought previously by institutional investors. ̂Specialt refers
now to a stock in the top quintile of the predicted fee distribution. The coefficient
on the interaction between high expected fee and institutional buying is positive and
significant but smaller economically. Stocks in the top fee quintile that have been bought
by institutional investors in the previous quarter experience a 19 basis point increase in
monthly abnormal return or 2.28% per year.
In column 4, the prediction includes proprietary loan information. Here the ab-
normal return associated with high fee stocks that have been bought by institutional
investors, while positive, is not significant.
While institutions seem to respond by increasing their holdings more strongly to an
increase in expected lending fee than to the actual fee, the premium they pay is smaller,
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possibly because of the uncertainty associated with the expectation. Nonetheless, the
results are consistent with the premise that institutional trading in the direction of the
high fee contributes to the overvaluation of high fee stocks.
In Figure 6, I take a closer look at the abnormal returns in the subsequent 6 months
using the same portfolio and Fama-Macbeth analyses. The top graph (doted bar) shows
the total annualized 4 factor abnormal return of the top fee quintile of stocks following a
calendar portfolio approach, up to 6 months after being ranked into the top fee quintile
at time t. The graph also shows the difference between the premium on high minus low
fee stocks for stocks that have been bought by institutional investors in the previous
quarter versus stocks where the institutional holdings did not increase (solid bar).
The graph below (doted bar) shows the total annualized 4 factor abnormal return
of the top fee quintile of stocks after controlling for stock characteristics like size, MTB,
age, standard deviation of returns, S&P 500 indicator, bid-ask spread, turnover, number
of analysts, and whether the stock pays dividends in a Fama-Macbeth regression.
The annualized abnormal returns (dotted bars) are positive at time t, but decrease
in the following quarters in line with the reduction in short selling constraint leading to
a decrease in returns, as in Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007). The graph also shows
the difference between the premium on high minus low fee stocks for stocks that have
been bought by institutional investors in the previous quarter versus stocks where the
institutional holdings did not increase (solid bars), the equivalent of the interaction term
of special and the increase in institutional ownership indicator variable. As can be seen
from the solid bars the premium difference-in-difference is positive and significant at
least in the following quarter after the stock is classified as special.
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VI Negative Information Trade-off
That stocks with high lending fees trade at a premium to low fee stocks and that that
premium is related to institutional trading suggests two results: future lending income is
capitalized into prices, and institutions anticipate the lending income and contribute to
the overvaluation. This does not mean that the negative information inherent in short
selling could not offset this effect.
Disagreement models suggest that excess demand for shorting implies there is neg-
ative information that is not yet incorporated into prices. The fact that short sale
trades predict future stock returns suggests that short sellers are informed, and could
potentially have access to private information.
This means that the same signal that exerts upward pressure on price, because of the
lending income, could also exerts downward pressure, because of the implied negative
information. The effect of these two competing factors could balance out.
I examine the interplay of information from disagreement predictions by first ex-
amining how an increase in lending fee influences the buying behavior of institutional
investors in the presence of negative news. I specifically test whether institutions are
less willing to purchase stocks that experience an increase in borrowing cost but also
have negative earnings news in a panel logit regression. I include two measures of neg-
ative news. The first measure is an indicator variable that equals one if the company
announces negative earnings (Negative Earningsit), as reported in the unadjusted sur-
prise history file in I/B/E/S. The second is the earnings surprise, the announced earnings
in excess of analysts’ consensus forecasts. This dummy variable, (Negative Surpriseit),
equals one if the reported earnings are lower than analyst expectations.
I measure the differential response of institutional investors holdings to an increase in
fee and a change in fee for stocks with negative news by including an interaction between
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the fee increase (Fee increaseit) or the change in fee (∆Feeit) and the negative news
variable. The results in Table 7 show that both the fee increase dummy and the change
in fee increase the likelihood the stock will be bought, but this effect weakens in the
presence of negative information. The results suggest that institutional investors realize
there is a trade-off between lending income and the implied negative information from
short selling, as they are less willing to buy high fee stocks that experience a negative
information shock.
Then, I test whether the overvaluation associated with high fee stocks is also less
pronounced when stocks experience a negative information shock. I rerun the Fama-
MacBeth analysis for the subsample of stocks that experience a negative information
shock using the same two measures, negative earnings, and negative earnings surprise,
in Panel A of Table 8. The coefficient on the interaction of the high fee indicator and
whether the stock was bought in the previous quarter by institutions is not significant,
neither for the actual fee (columns 1-3), nor the expected fee (columns 4-9). The pre-
mium that institutional investors pay for high fee stocks is insignificant in the subsample
of stocks that experience a negative information shock, but remains significant in the
subsample of stocks where there is no negative information release (Panel B, Table 8).
VII Mutual Fund Security Lending and Portfolio Decision
Both the univariate and multivariate analyses present evidence consistent with the
idea that institutional investors are willing to purchase high fee shares to gain lending
income. In this section, I will focus on the willingness to purchase shares with increasing
lending fees of a particular set of institutional investors, namely mutual funds. Following
Evans, Ferreira, and Prado (2012), I examine the security lending practices and portfolio
decisions of mutual funds to determine whether mutual funds are more likely to allow
22
security lending if the aggregate lending fee was high in the previous month and how an
increase in lending fee influences their portfolio allocations.
Evans, Ferreira, and Prado (2012) examine security lending practices of mutual funds
and their impact on performance, using a sample of 2,093 active and 186 passive equity
funds over the 1996-2008 period. They collect the N-SAR-B annual fund filings, from
the SEC’s Edgar database. The N-SAR form provides information on whether or not a
fund is allowed by its prospectus to lend securities and whether or not it actually lends
equities.
If institutional investors are buying high fee stocks for the purpose of lending, there
will be a positive relation between allowing a security lending program and the level of
lending fees. For the sample period between 2002 and 2008 I obtain aggregate monthly
value weighted average lending fees from Data Explorers and match that to the data of
Evans, Ferreira, and Prado (2012) to test whether the aggregate lending income in the
previous month is an important predictor of whether a mutual fund will allow security
lending. In line with Evans, Ferreira, and Prado (2012) I include both family level
controls like family size, lagged average family performance rank, the Herfindahl index
of total net assets (TNA) in each Morningstar investment objective, average active share,
family flow, family expense ratio and the percentage of index, subadvised and broker
funds in the family, and fund level controls as fund size, turnover, age, active share and
lagged performance rank.16 Column 1 through 4 of Table 9 reports the odds following a
logit regression of the likelihood of allowing a security lending program for the sample
period 2002-2008 (columns 1-2) and the period under study 2006-2008 (columns 3-4).
The aggregate lending fee is indeed an important predictor, as a 1% increase in
lending fee makes mutual funds 3.10 times more likely of allowing security lending for
16The results are robust to just the inclusion of fund level controls or just family controls. For more details on the data
sources I refer to Evans, Ferreira, and Prado (2012).
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the sample period 2002-2008 and 1.92 times for the period 2006-2008. In columns 2
and 4 I introduce fund fixed effects and the identification will thus come from the funds
that experienced a change in security lending allowance. In the Evans, Ferreira, and
Prado (2012) sample period, 17.81% of active funds and 38.5% of index funds switch
from prohibiting to allowing security lending. Less than 3% of the active and index funds
switch from allowing to prohibiting security lending. So while changes are not uncommon
the introduction of fixed effects does significantly lower the number of observations.
Column 2 shows that funds that changed their security lending practice are 2.9 times
more likely to allow security lending if the fee in the previous month is as high as 1% in
the sample period 2002-2008. For the subsample 2006-2008 the odds of allowing security
lending when changing the lending status is as high as 9.5 times.
For mutual funds the security lending fee seems to be an important reason for allow-
ing a security lending program. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence that mutual
funds are shifting their lending strategy from volume-oriented in which funds lend out
a large percentage of easy-to-find securities towards value lending, a strategy involving
lending only those securities that generate significant revenues.17 However, the question
remains whether they would buy a stock for the purpose of gaining lending income. To
address this question, I look at the underlying holdings of mutual funds and test whether
an increase in lending fee would lead to an increased likelihood of a fund increasing their
holdings in that particular stock. The holdings data is from the Mutual Fund Holdings
Database from Thomson Financial.
Table 10 reports the results of a logit regression of the likelihood of a mutual fund
increasing the holdings in a stock. I include the same control variables as in the pre-
vious institutional holdings regressions; size, MTB, age, standard deviation of returns,
S&P 500 indicator, bid-ask spread, turnover, price, number of analysts, past return and
whether the stock pays dividends. To account for seasonal changes in the holdings I also
17Vanguard Research: Security Lending is still no free lunch, July 2011.
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include period fixed effects. In line with the findings on institutional investors in gen-
eral, the first column in Table 10 shows that mutual funds are 1.70 times more likely to
increase their holdings in a stock if the stock has experienced an increase in lending fee.
In the second column, I introduce fund-stock pair fixed effects to capture the variation
within the portfolio and the results are even stronger. When changing their portfolio
holdings, mutual funds are two times more likely to increase their allocation to stocks
with increasing fees. The findings are in line with a quote from the securities lending
handbook of 2011: “Within the securities lending world, the basic premise is that you
have to buy the underlying securities and lend them out.” - Beneficial Owner & Pension
Fund Securities Lending Handbook 2011, page 16.
VIII Alternative Interpretation
An alternative interpretation of the results is that institutional investors are covering
their short sale positions and are caught in a so-called “short squeeze”. That is insti-
tutions holding short positions are forced to purchase shares when the price increases
rapidly, in order to exit their short position. In October 2008, a short squeeze temporar-
ily drove the shares of Volkswagen on the Xetra DAX from e210.85 to over e1000 in
under two days.18
To rule out this possibility, I rerun the trading and return analysis, now controlling
for the level of short interest. Conceivably, if institutional investors are forced to close
their positions, the maximum amount they will need to buy is the amount of outstanding
shorts. Alternatively, I use the percentage of shares borrowed as reported by Data
Explorers. The inclusion of short interest in Table 1 of the appendix, (columns 1-3,
Panel A), does not reduce the economic effect of the response in institutional ownership,
as the coefficients on the dummy fee increase remain economically significant. Moreover,
18http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/oct/29/vw-volkswagen-short-selling.
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short interest reduces neither the number of institutions holding the stock in response to
a fee increase nor the likelihood that the stock will be bought. In columns 4-6, I include
the number of shares borrowed as a proxy for the number of stocks to be covered in the
event of a squeeze. The effect of a fee increase on the change in institutional ownership
(column 4), on the number of institutional investors (column 5), and on the probability
of purchase (column 6) remains significant.
In an alternative test, I split the sample of stocks into large and small on the basis
of market capitalization, as short squeezes are more frequent among small-capitalization
stocks. A stock is classified as small-cap if its market capitalization is below $2 billion,
and large if its market capitalization is higher than $10 billion.
In Panel B of Table 1 of the appendix, I examine the relation between the fee
increase dummy and institutional trading separately for large- and small-capitalization
stocks. The response of institutional investors to an increase in lending fee is much
more pronounced for the larger stocks, in terms of the increase in holdings, and the
likelihood of purchase. The effect is about twice as strong for larger stocks than for
small-capitalization ones. The effect of an increase in the fee is only larger for smaller
stocks for the number of institutions holding the stock.
The fact that total institutional ownership does not increase for small-capitalization
stocks and that the likelihood of purchase is economically smaller provides evidence that
my results are not driven by any squeeze on small-capitalization stocks. The results
mostly come from the larger stocks in the sample, where a short squeeze is less likely to
occur.
In Table 2 of the appendix, I test whether the return results are robust to the in-
clusion of short interest or loan quantity (Panel A). The inclusion of both short interest
(columns 1-3) or loan quantity (columns 4-6) does not reduce the significance of the in-
teraction between institutional buying and the return on high fee stocks. Once I account
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for the level of short selling, the annualized risk-adjusted return difference between the
high fee stocks that are previously bought by institutions and high fee stocks that were
not is 4.39% (0.366 × 12).
In Panel B, I split the sample again in small-and large-capitalization stocks. If a
short squeeze is responsible for the findings, I would expect a greater overvaluation effect
for small-capitalization stocks, where a squeeze is much more likely. The premium on
high fee stocks versus low fee stocks is still higher when the stocks were acquired in the
previous quarter by institutional investors, but the premium is only significant for the
larger-capitalization stocks, further providing support against a short squeeze as driving
the results.
IX Conclusion
By lending shares to short sellers, institutional investors benefit by receiving lending
income. In 2008, institutions made $1.5 billion this way. In this study I test the Duffie,
Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2002) hypothesis that security prices incorporate expected
future securities lending income. To determine whether institutional investors anticipate
gains from future lending of securities, I examine their trading behavior around changes
in loan fees.
Impulse-response functions following a panel VAR show that a one standard de-
viation increase in the lending fee increases institutional ownership by 0.50% and the
number of institutions holding the stock by 0.90% in the following quarter. This sug-
gests that institutions buy shares in response to an increase in lending fees and that this
could explain the premium associated with high lending fee stocks.
In effect, the overvaluation associated with high lending fees is most pronounced
among stocks that institutional investors are trading in the direction of the high fee
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possibly to gain lending income. For example, among stocks with intense institutional
trading, the average contemporaneous four-factor alpha spread between high and low
fee stocks is 2.78% per month (t-statistic=3.52). Among stocks with low institutional
trading, the risk-adjusted return spread between high and low fee stocks is actually
negative and statistically significant. When including firm level controls in a Fama-
Macbeth specification the difference in risk-adjusted return between a high fee stock
that is bought by institutional investors and a top fee quintile stock that is not bought
by institutions is 2.64% per year.
Overall, this study identifies an important mechanism that drives the overvaluation
of high fee stocks by showing that institutional investors trade in the direction of the
high fee to gain lending income and thereby contribute to the overvaluation. The results
further imply that overpricing caused by the presence of short sale constraints is partly
a result of capitalized lending income.
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IO Institutional investor ownership.
The number of shares held by
institutional investors divided by
the total number of shares out-
standing. Observations with to-
tal institutional ownership greater
than 100% excluded.
The institutional holdings data
are from CDA/Spectrum. The
data about stock prices and re-
turns come from the Center
for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP).
Number of Institutions (NIO) Number of institutional investors
holding the shares.
CDA/Spectrum.
∆ IO First difference of institutional
ownership (IO).
CDA/Spectrum.
(∆ln(1+NIO)) First difference of the natural log
of one plus the number of institu-
tional investors.
CDA/Spectrum.
Fee Weekly value-weighted average
fee.
Data Explorers
∆ Fee First difference of fee. Data Explorers
Fee increase Dummy variable equal to one if
the loan fee increased.
Data Explorers
On Loan Quantity of borrowed securities as
a percentage of shares outstand-
ing.
Data Explorers
Short Interest Total of outstanding shorted
shares.
Shortsqueeze.com
Utilization Value of assets on loan from ben-
eficial owners relative to the lend-
able asset value.
Data Explorers
Inventory Available inventory quantity from
beneficial owners as a percentage
of shares outstanding.
Data Explorers
Inventory Accounts Total number of inventory ac-
counts. Separate count for each
row of inventory held by each un-
derlying beneficial owner or fund
that owns the security.
Data Explorers
Active Agents Number of custodians with open
transactions.
Data Explorers
Failure Occurrence Total cumulative occurrence of
fails-to-deliver for the specific time
period.
Federal Reserve website.
Continue on next page
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Variable Definition Source
Mcap Market Capitalization. Price x
shares outstanding.
CRSP
MTB Market-to-book ratio. Market
capitalization divided by the book
value for the fiscal year ended be-
fore the most recent June 30.
Compustat/CRSP
Bid-Ask Difference between the closing bid
and ask quotes for a security over
the security price.
CRSP
Turnover Volume over shares outstanding. CRSP
Price Share price. CRSP
S&P 500 Dummy variable that equals one
if a company is in the S&P 500
index.
Compustat Annual Updates Index
Constituents
Age Firm age calculated as the number
of years since first returns appear
in CRSP.
CRSP
Stdev Volatility, measured as the stan-
dard deviation of monthly returns
over a year.
Monthly price and return data
from CRSP
Ret Quarterly stock return.
Four-Factor Alpha Monthly Carhart (1997) four-
factor alpha with factor loadings
estimated over the prior three
years using monthly data. The al-
phas are winsorized at 1% to min-
imize the impact of outliers.
Special Dummy that equals one if the
stock is in the top fee quintile.
Buy Dummy variable that equals one
if institutional investors purchased
the stock in the previous quarter.
Dividend Dummy variable that equals one if
the firm pays dividends.
Compustat
Negative Earnings Dummy variable that equals one
if the firm has announced nega-
tive earnings, as reported in the
unadjusted surprise history file in
I/B/E/S.
Unadjusted surprise history file in
I/B/E/S
Negative Surprise Announced earnings in excess of
the analysts’ consensus forecasts.
Equals one if the earnings surprise
is negative.
Unadjusted surprise history file in
I/B/E/S
NumAnalyst Number of analysts following the
stock, as reported in the un-
adjusted surprise history file in
I/B/E/S. Missing values are set to
zero.





This table presents the descriptive statistics (Panel A) of the variables used in this study. Panel B reports the
average differences between stocks with annualized lending fees below 1% and stocks with fees above 1% and the
test of equality of the means (t−test) and medians (Wilcoxon) across both groups. The details of data sources
and variable definitions are in the appendix.
Panel A: Sample Descriptive Statistics
N Mean p25 Median p75 Stdev
IO (%) 30642 54.24 28.98 57.74 80.43 29.45
NIO (%) 30642 139.53 28.00 77.00 160.00 194.52
∆ IO 30642 0.57 -1.82 0.29 2.87 7.44
ln (1+NIO) 30642 2.47 -6.41 0.86 9.33 21.57
Fee (%) 25468 0.99 0.14 0.17 0.55 2.60
Fee increase 30642 0.35 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.48
∆ Fee 30642 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.03 1.24
On Loan (%) 30642 4.20 0.35 2.40 6.15 5.09
Short Interest (%) 30642 4.07 0.02 1.80 6.31 5.81
Utilization (%) 30642 21.92 2.60 13.15 33.73 23.77
Inventory (%) 30642 15.23 5.77 14.86 23.32 10.51
Inventory Accounts 30642 331.35 39.67 176.00 403.67 462.95
Active Agents 30642 25.01 4.00 21.00 38.00 23.58
Failure (%) 9264 0.23 0.03 0.08 0.21 0.59
Failure Occurrence 30642 0.54 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.97
Mcap 30642 4,196,263 99,428 353,076 1,615,062 18,700,000
MTB 30642 1.44 0.37 0.90 1.74 2.47
Bid-Ask (%) 30642 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.66
Turnover (%) 30642 180.51 44.19 123.44 235.64 224.38
Price 30642 23.21 6.69 15.12 30.20 43.24
S&P 500 (%) 30642 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13
Age 30642 15.89 4.00 11.00 22.00 16.26
Ret (%) 30642 -2.93 -9.60 0.00 3.34 14.20
Dividend 30642 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.49
Stdev (%) 30642 33.65 19.33 30.98 46.20 20.39
NumAnalyst 30642 17.86 3.00 12.00 26.00 19.31
Continue on next page
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Panel B: Differences between High and Low Fee Stocks
Low Fee High Fee t-test Wilcoxon
Stocks Stocks Difference p-value p-value
IO (%) 62.76 36.81 -25.95 0.00 0.00
NIO (%) 178.90 59.02 -119.88 0.00 0.00
∆ IO 0.52 0.69 0.17 0.06 0.49
ln (1+NIO) 1.63 4.19 2.56 0.85 0.80
Fee (%) 0.21 4.26 4.05 0.00 0.00
Fee increase 0.39 0.27 -0.12 0.00 0.00
∆ Fee -0.15 0.27 0.42 0.00 0.00
On Loan (%) 4.34 3.93 -0.41 0.00 0.00
Short Interest (%) 3.94 4.33 0.39 0.00 0.00
Utilization (%) 17.70 30.57 12.88 0.00 0.00
Inventory (%) 18.78 7.97 -10.81 0.00 0.00
Inventory Accounts 434.66 120.01 -314.65 0.00 0.00
Active Agents 29.81 15.19 -14.62 0.00 0.00
Failure (%) 0.11 0.35 0.24 0.00 0.00
Failure Occurrence 0.33 0.97 0.64 0.00 0.00
Mcap 5,819,798 875,123 -4,944,675 0.00 0.00
MTB 1.31 1.71 0.39 0.00 0.03
Bid-Ask (%) 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.53 0.01
Turnover (%) 195.93 148.96 -46.97 0.00 0.00
Price 28.55 12.27 -16.28 0.00 0.00
S&P 500 (%) 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00
Age 19.78 10.45 -9.33 0.00 0.00
Ret (%) -2.49 -3.84 -1.35 0.00 0.00
Dividend 0.46 0.23 -0.22 0.00 0.00
Stdev (%) 32.52 35.97 3.44 0.00 0.00
NumAnalyst 21.72 9.97 11.75 0.00 0.00
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Table 2
Institutional Ownership Trading around Fee increases in a Panel VAR
The panel VAR approach is a multivariate simultaneous equation system that treats all variables as endogenous,
while allowing for unobserved firm heterogeneity. The lag length of 1 was selected following the AIC. The
specification of the first-order VAR is as follows:
yit = Υ0 + Υ1yit−1 + fi + dt + εit
where yit is a vector including the change in institutional ownership (∆ IO), and the annualized lending fee
in Panel A. In Panel B, I include the quarterly stock return to control for changes in stock price, which might
lead to changes in short sellers’ demand and in turn lending fees and institutional ownership. fi introduces
stock fixed effects and dt period-specific time dummies. In Panel C and D, the yit vector includes changes in
the natural log of one plus the number of institutional investors (∆ln(1+NIO)). Panel C is the two-variable
panel VAR, while Panel D includes the stock return. Fee is the average percentage short sale fee and Ret is the
quarterly stock return. Robust t−statistics are reported, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The details of data
sources and variable definitions are in the appendix.
Panel A: ∆ IO VAR analysis Panel C:∆ ln(1+NIO) VAR analysis
Dependent variable: ∆ IOt Dependent variable:∆ ln(1+NIO)t
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
∆ IOt−1 -0.315*** -24.14 ∆ ln(1+NIO)t−1 -0.211*** -7.37
Feet−1 0.366** 2.71 Feet−1 0.660** 2.51
Dependent variable: Feet Dependent variable: Feet
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
∆ IOt−1 -0.005*** -3.39 ∆ ln(1+NIO)t−1 -0.003*** -4.52
Feet−1 0.239*** 3.58 Feet−1 0.241*** 3.94
Panel B: ∆ IO VAR analysis Panel D:∆ ln(1+NIO) VAR analysis
Dependent variable: ∆ IOt Dependent variable:∆ ln(1+NIO)t
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
∆ IOt−1 -0.326*** -24.55 ∆ ln(1+NIO)t−1 -0.213*** -10.07
Feet−1 0.514*** 4.27 Feet−1 0.947*** 3.55
Rett−1 -1.028*** -6.49 Rett−1 -0.624 -1.30
Dependent variable: Feet Dependent variable: Feet
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
∆ IOt−1 -0.005*** -3.36 ∆ ln(1+NIO)t−1 -0.004*** -4.69
Feet−1 0.280*** 4.37 Feet−1 0.285*** 4.83
Rett−1 -0.222 -0.59 Rett−1 -0.231 -0.57
Dependent variable: Rett Dependent variable: Rett
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
∆ IOt−1 -0.001*** -3.18 ∆ IOt−1 -0.001*** -5.59
Feet−1 0.003 0.64 Feet−1 0.004 0.86
Rett−1 0.008 0.45 Rett−1 0.008 0.47
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Table 3
Institutional Ownership Trading behavior around Fee increases
Panel regression of institutional ownership and trading on an indicator variable of fee increase and stock specific
control variables and year dummies. Panel data are U.S. common equity stock from the last quarter of 2006 to
the last quarter of 2008. Column 5 reports the odds of buying a stock following a logit specification, where a buy
is defined as an increase in institutional ownership. Results are reported in percentages. Robust t−statistics in
parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The details of data sources and variable definitions are in the
appendix.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln ∆ ∆ ln Odds
IOt (1+NIO)t IOt (1+NIO)t Buyt
Fee increaset,t−1 0.975*** 1.888*** 0.887*** 1.395*** 1.334***
(10.81) (7.96) (8.74) (5.31) (10.36)
Ln(Mcap)t 5.046*** 25.122*** 2.596*** 8.608*** 2.065***
(15.40) (26.01) (13.77) (16.06) (14.41)
Bid-Askt 0.268** -0.263*** 0.029 0.185*** 0.995
(2.56) (-3.34) (0.41) (3.61) (-0.27)
Turnovert 0.003*** 0.002* 0.000 0.001 1.000
(4.64) (1.77) (0.08) (1.28) (0.69)
Pricet -0.009 0.038** -0.005 0.021* 0.998
(-1.04) (1.99) (-1.60) (1.88) (-1.56)
S&P 500t 2.750 7.737 0.904 9.540*** 1.255
(0.63) (0.86) (0.76) (3.64) (0.56)
Aget 0.225 0.967* -0.086 -0.763 0.945**
(1.28) (1.75) (-0.50) (-0.89) (-2.10)
Stdevt -0.002 0.113*** -0.045*** -0.122*** 0.989***
(-0.42) (6.81) (-10.09) (-8.50) (-10.06)
Returnt−1 -0.055*** -0.188*** -0.012*** -0.028*** 0.997***
(-16.53) (-19.58) (-3.64) (-3.09) (-3.05)
MTBt -0.582*** -2.577*** 0.025 0.265 0.983
(-5.28) (-6.29) (0.42) (1.48) (-1.21)
Dividendt 0.941*** 3.389*** -0.041 -0.824 1.201**
(3.09) (4.17) (-0.18) (-1.21) (2.36)
NumAnalystt 0.270*** 0.858*** -0.104*** -0.416*** 0.981***
(11.33) (12.31) (-7.52) (-7.89) (-5.88)
Stock Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 30,642 30,642 30,642 30,642 29,681
Number of stocks 4,040 4,040 4,040 4,040 3,621




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Institutional Trading and Fee: Independent sort
The stocks are sorted each month into five equal weight portfolios using the lending fee and change in institutional
ownership with respect to the previous quarter. The first two institutional ownership quintiles represent an
average decrease in ownership and as of quintile 3 the average change is an increase in holdings, which is
increasing in quintiles 4 and 5. The time-series averages of equal-weighted daily return and factor model alphas
are reported in percentages. The alphas are the intercepts from the one (CAPM) in panel B, and Carhart 4
factor model in panel C. The t-statistics are Newey West adjusted for 5 lags and shown in parentheses below
the coefficient estimates. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Panel A: Average Returnt
Fee
∆ IOt 1 2 3 4 5 H-L
Decrease 1 -2.88 -4.76 -5.31 -4.93 -6.47 -3.60***
(-1.62) (-2.42) (-3.29) (-2.30) (-3.35) (-5.12)
2 -5.83 -7.68 -12.09 -7.75 -11.29 -5.46***
(-4.69) (-3.28) (-7.31) (-4.59) (-9.35) (-6.90)
3 -6.32 -11.82 -13.72 -8.43 -14.20 -7.88***
(-3.71) (-3.06) (-9.56) (-3.36) (-5.00) (-5.73)
4 -2.34 -3.64 -5.75 -5.13 -5.27 -2.93*
(-1.91) (-1.86) (-3.40) (-1.60) (-1.97) (-1.77)
5 -1.15 -1.18 -1.94 -2.11 1.08 2.23**
Increase (-0.82) (-0.68) (-1.11) (-1.06) (0.56) (2.68)
H-L 1.73** 3.58*** 3.37*** 2.82*** 7.56*** 5.83***
(2.49) (5.32) (5.87) (4.63) (7.43) (6.09)
Panel B: CAPM Alphat
Decrease 1 -1.75 -3.52 -4.13 -3.65 -5.33 -3.58***
(-4.33) (-4.35) (-7.33) (-5.58) (-6.42) (-4.68)
2 -4.92 -6.93 -11.87 -7.10 -10.55 -5.64***
(-5.41) (-3.36) (-5.71) (-8.44) (-11.34) (-7.04)
3 -5.47 -11.04 -13.38 -7.51 -13.47 -8.00***
(-5.91) (-2.99) (-9.26) (-4.98) (-6.10) (-4.79)
4 -1.57 -2.54 -4.84 -3.95 -4.07 -2.51*
(-2.72) (-4.20) (-3.95) (-1.98) (-2.74) (-1.91)
5 -0.20 -0.09 -0.56 -1.28 2.55 2.75***
Increase (-0.44) (-0.22) (-0.90) (-1.14) (3.14) (3.87)
H-L 1.55** 3.43*** 3.56*** 2.37*** 7.88*** 6.33***
(2.23) (4.91) (5.82) (3.85) (6.38) (6.37)
Panel C: Carhart 4 Factor Alphat
Decrease 1 -2.01 -3.41 -4.10 -3.57 -5.21 -3.21***
(-4.19) (-3.85) (-6.03) (-5.07) (-5.04) (-5.09)
2 -5.03 -6.73 -12.22 -7.06 -10.58 -5.55***
(-5.60) (-3.46) (-6.64) (-7.48) (-17.37) (-4.92)
3 -5.22 -10.47 -13.52 -7.20 -13.41 -8.18***
(-5.70) (-3.19) (-9.31) (-4.85) (-5.52) (-4.18)
4 -1.69 -2.53 -4.78 -3.99 -3.90 -2.21
(-3.06) (-4.08) (-3.50) (-2.03) (-2.66) (-1.55)
5 -0.09 -0.16 -0.55 -1.25 2.69 2.78***
Increase (-0.22) (-0.30) (-0.81) (-0.98) (4.08) (3.52)
H-L 1.91** 3.25*** 3.55*** 2.32*** 7.90*** 5.99***
(2.56) (4.39) (4.90) (3.31) (5.24) (5.67)
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Table 6
Abnormal return and Institutional Buying
Fama Macbeth regression explaining the Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha with factor loadings estimated over
the prior three years using monthly data. The alphas are winsorized at 1% to minimize the impact of outliers.
The reported results are in percentages. Stocks are classified as Specialt if they belong to the highest fee quintile.
̂Specialt is an indicator variable that equals one if the stock is ranked as the highest predicted fee quintile. I
predict the lending fee as a function of the occurrence of a failure-to-deliver and stock characteristics like size,
MTB, age, standard deviation of returns, S&P 500 indicator, bid-ask spread, turnover, price, past return and
whether the stock pays dividends. The second prediction used for ̂Special2t includes proprietary information on
utilization levels as reported by Data Explorers. Robust t−statistics in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1. The details of data sources and remaining variable definitions are in the appendix.



















ln(MCAP)t -0.004 -0.008 -0.002 -0.011
(-0.09) (-0.17) (-0.03) (-0.25)
Bid-Askt 0.117*** 0.116*** 0.118*** 0.113***
(3.19) (3.17) (3.23) (3.16)
Turnovert 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014***
(2.88) (2.86) (3.02) (3.20)
S&P 500t 0.021 0.022 0.020 0.015
(0.25) (0.26) (0.24) (0.18)
MTBt 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.016
(0.52) (0.51) (0.58) (0.72)
Dividendt -0.257*** -0.265*** -0.259*** -0.263***
(-3.90) (-3.97) (-3.95) (-3.97)
NumAnalystt -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018***
(-3.18) (-3.26) (-3.37) (-3.13)
Constant 0.353 0.399 0.282 0.432
(0.52) (0.60) (0.43) (0.67)
Observations 66,011 62,010 62,010 62,010




Panel (U.S. common equity stock from June 2006 to December 2008) logit regression of an increase in institu-
tional ownership (buy) on loan fee increase and stock specific control variables and year dummies. Results are
reported in odds. The first measure is an indicator variable that equals one if the company announces negative
earnings (Negative Earningsit). The second measure equals one if the earnings surprise, the announced earnings
in excess of the analysts consensus forecasts, is negative (Negative Surpriseit). The details of data sources and
variable definitions are in the appendix. Robust t−statistics in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fee increaset,t−1 1.363*** 1.355***
(10.28) (10.17)
Negative Earningst 0.959 0.925
(-0.71) (-1.52)
Negative Earningst*Fee increaset,t−1 0.882*
(-1.73)
∆ Feet,t−1 1.085*** 1.077***
(6.44) (6.08)
Negative Earningst*∆ Feet,t−1 0.923***
(-3.69)
Negative Surpriset 1.002 0.971
(0.04) (-0.51)
Negative Surpriset*Fee increaset,t−1 0.899
(-1.42)
Negative Surpriset*∆ Fee t,t−1 0.936***
(-2.98)
Ln(Mcap)t 2.049*** 2.075*** 2.057*** 2.082***
(14.23) (14.48) (14.30) (14.55)
Bid-Askt 0.994 0.993 0.994 0.993
(-0.29) (-0.35) (-0.28) (-0.33)
Turnovert 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.72) (0.89) (0.67) (0.85)
Pricet 0.998 0.997 0.998 0.998
(-1.57) (-1.56) (-1.55) (-1.54)
S&P 500t 1.254 1.203 1.262 1.216
(0.55) (0.46) (0.57) (0.48)
Aget 0.944** 0.947** 0.944** 0.947**
(-2.12) (-2.05) (-2.11) (-2.03)
Stdevt 0.989*** 0.989*** 0.989*** 0.989***
(-10.07) (-10.61) (-10.05) (-10.59)
Returnt−1 0.998*** 0.997*** 0.998*** 0.997***
(-3.00) (-2.86) (-3.03) (-2.88)
MTBt 0.984 0.984 0.983 0.983
(-1.18) (-1.17) (-1.19) (-1.20)
Dividendt 1.198** 1.199** 1.200** 1.199**
(2.33) (2.35) (2.36) (2.35)
NumAnalystt 0.981*** 0.911*** 0.980*** 0.981***
(-5.81) (-5.66) (-5.84) (-5.71)
Stock Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 29,681 29,681 29,681 29,681
Number of stocks 3,621 3,621 3,621 3,621
Pseudo R2 3.91% 3.67% 3.89% 3.65%
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Table 8
Abnormal Return and Institutional Buying in the Negative News subsample
Fama Macbeth regression explaining the Carhart (1997) 4-factor alpha with factor loadings estimated over the
prior three years using monthly data. The alphas are winsorized at 1% to minimize the impact of outliers.
The reported results are in percentages. Panel A reports the results for the sample of stocks with negative
earnings news. The first subsample is of companies announcing negative earnings, as reported in the unadjusted
surprise history file in I/B/E/S. The second sample is for stocks with announced earnings short of the analysts
consensus forecasts. Panel B reports the results for the sample of stocks with no negative earnings news.
Stocks are classified as Specialt if they belong to the highest fee quintile. ̂Specialt is an indicator variable that
equals one if the stock is ranked as the highest predicted fee quintile, the fee is predicted as a function of the
occurrence of a failure-to-deliver and stock characteristics like size, MTB, age, standard deviation of returns,
S&P 500 indicator, bid-ask spread, turnover, price, past return, number of analysts and whether the stock pays
dividends. The second prediction used for ̂Special2t includes proprietary information on utilization levels as
reported by Data Explorers. Robust t−statistics in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Continue
on next page.
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Continued from Previous Page
Panel A: Negative News Subsample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Buyt−1 -0.110 -0.035 0.060 0.064 0.029 0.067













Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Negative News Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings
Surprise Surprise Earnings Surprise
Observations 8,979 23,125 8,979 23,125 8,979 23,125
Pseudo R2 6.47% 3.86% 6.41% 3.91% 6.40% 3.92%
Panel B: No Negative News Subsample
(1) (2) (3)














Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 53,031 53,031 53,031
Pseudo R2 3.75% 3.82% 3.96%
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Table 9
Mutual Fund Security Lending Decision
The table shows the odds following a logit regressions of the fund decision to allow security lending using fund
family and fund characteristics as explanatory variables. The data is from Evans, Ferreira, and Prado (2012).
Security Lending Allowed is a dummy variable that equals one if a fund is allowed to lend shares and zero
otherwise (N-SAR form question 70N). TNA is the fund’s total net assets in $ millions. Family TNA is the sum
of the total net assets of management company in $ millions. Average Family Performance Rank is the average
of the performance rank of funds in the fund family. Average Family Expense Ratio is the average expense
ratio of funds in the fund family. Investment Objective Herfindahl is a herfindahl of the Morningstar investment
objective of funds in the fund family. Family Net Flow is the average net flow of funds in the fund family.
Average Family Active Share is the average active share of funds in the fund family. Index Funds in Family is
the percentage of index funds in the fund family. Subadvised in Family is the percentage of subadvised funds
in the fund family. Broker Funds in Family is the percentage of funds sold through brokers as measured by the
presence of a front load, rear load or 12b1 above 0.25% in the fund family. Turnover is the ratio of aggregated
sales or aggregated purchases of securities divided by the average 12-month total net assets of the fund. Active
Share refers to the active share measure of Cremers and Petajisto (2009). Performance Rank is the rank quintile
within investment style using 36-month of past fund returns. Age is measured as the current date minus the
first offer date. Robust t−statistics in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Continue on next page.
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Continued from Previous Page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aggregate Feet−1 3.102*** 2.887*** 1.917*** 9.492***
(6.14) (6.55) (3.78) (6.20)
Log(Family TNA)t 1.066** 0.986 1.133*** 4.626***
(2.07) (-0.37) (3.39) (10.02)
Average Family Performance Rankt−1 0.958* 0.959 0.899*** 0.700***
(-1.68) (-1.22) (-3.06) (-4.86)
Investment Objective Herfindahlt 0.991*** 0.999 0.993** 0.996
(-3.62) (-0.06) (-2.37) (-0.54)
Average Family Active Sharet 0.986* 0.973*** 0.992 0.825***
(-1.94) (-4.21) (-0.80) (-8.08)
Family Flowt 0.982*** 0.965*** 0.999 0.968**
(-3.85) (-7.30) (-0.02) (-2.57)
% Index Funds in Familyt 1.039*** 1.032*** 1.046*** 0.879***
(3.78) (2.69) (4.01) (-3.04)
% Sudadvised in Familyt 0.986*** 1.027*** 0.989*** 0.918***
(-9.66) (16.82) (-6.12) (-13.49)
% Broker Funds in Familyt 0.996 0.996* 1.000 1.012
(-1.24) (-1.87) (0.02) (1.62)
Average Family Expense Ratiot 1.338 0.189*** 1.630** 0.001***
(1.48) (-9.59) (1.97) (-11.04)
ln(Age)t 0.697*** 1.172*** 0.744*** 4.768***
(-4.70) (2.69) (-3.33) (7.39)
Turnovert 1.02 1.512*** 0.989 5.462***
(0.28) (10.29) (-0.25) (12.11)
Active Sharet 1.002 0.973*** 1.002 0.948***
(0.57) (-8.19) (0.59) (-4.85)
ln(TNA)t 0.889*** 0.968 0.842*** 0.697***
(-3.00) (-1.01) (-3.60) (-2.89)
Fund Performance Rankt−1 0.992 0.967** 1.005 0.936**
(-0.55) (-2.56) (0.28) (-2.47)
Fund Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Subsample 2002-2008 2002-2008 2006-2008 2006-2008
Observations 107267 20577 49820 5528
Number of Funds 1999 300 1721 161
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Table 10
Mutual Fund Portfolio Decision
The table reports the odds following a logit regression of the likelihood of a mutual fund increasing their holdings
in a stock. The holdings data is from the Mutual Fund Holdings Database from Thomson Financial. Robust
t−statistics in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
(1) (2)
























Period Fixed Effects Yes Yes
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Loan Quantity (EW) Loan Quantity (VW)
Figure 1
Daily Lending Fee and Loan Quantity
The top graph shows the daily equal (EW) and value weighted (VW) average lending fee for all stocks
in the Data explorers data set for June 2006 to December 2008 and the bottom graph the daily loan
quantity relative to shares outstanding.
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Figure 2




























































































































Stocks with Fees<1% 
Top two panel graphs show the percentage change in institutional ownership for stocks with an annual-
ized lending fee of 1% at time t (right) and the remaining stocks with a lending fee below 1% at time t
(left), two quarters before and two quarters after the lending fee reaches the 1% threshold. The bottom
two panel graphs show the percentage change in the number of institutional investors for stocks with
an annualized lending fee of 1% at time t (right) and the remaining stocks with a lending fee below 1%
at time t (left), two quarters before and two quarters after the lending fee reaches the 1% threshold.
The details of data sources and variable definitions are in the appendix.
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Figure 3
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The change in fee in basis points, the percentage inventory, on loan quantities, and utilization of high
(fee >= 1%) and low fee (fee < 1%) stocks, two quarters before and two quarters after the lending
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Impulse Response P95 P5
Impulse-response functions describing the reaction of the change in institutional ownership (∆ IO)
to a one standard deviation innovation in fee (Top panel, left), and the reaction of fee (Top panel,
right) to a one standard deviation innovation in the change in institutional ownership. Bottom panels
impulse-response functions describe the reaction of the change in the number of institutional owners
(∆ ln(1+NIO) to a one standard deviation innovation in fee (Bottom panel, left), and the reaction
of fee (Bottom panel, right) to a one standard deviation innovation in the change in the number of
institutions.The impulse-response functions follow from a first-order VAR model specification and fund
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Figure 5
Trade and Fee rank
Each quarter a stock is ranked into 5 groups according to the change in institutional ownership. The top
graph shows the average change in fee in basis points for stocks in each institutional trading quintile.
The bottom graph shows the average change in fee in basis points for stocks that are bought and sold
by institutional investors. A buy corresponds to an increase in institutional ownership and a sell a
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Figure 6
Abnormal Return and Fee
The top graph (doted bar) shows the total annualized 4 factor abnormal return of the top fee quintile
of stocks following a monthly calendar portfolio approach, up to 6 months after being ranked into the
top fee quintile at time t.The graph also shows the difference between the premium on high minus low
fee stocks for stocks that have been bought by institutional investors in the previous quarter versus
stocks where the institutional holdings did not increase (solid bar). The graph below (doted bar) shows
the total annualized 4 factor abnormal return of the top fee quintile of stocks after controlling for stock
characteristics like size, MTB, age, standard deviation of returns, S&P 500 indicator, bid-ask spread,
turnover, number of analysts, and whether the stock pays dividends in a Fama Macbeth regression.
The graph also shows the difference between the premium on high minus low fee stocks for stocks that
have been bought by institutional investors in the previous quarter versus stocks where the institutional





Trading Behavior and Short Squeeze
Panel regression of the change in institutional ownership on fee increase and stock specific control variables,
including short interest and loan quantity, year dummies and stock fixed effects. Results are reported in
percentages. Year dummies and controls are not reported. Controls include size, MTB, age, standard deviation
of returns, S&P 500 indicator, bid-ask spread, turnover, price, past return, number of analysts and whether the
stock pays dividends. Panel data are U.S. common equity stock from June 2006 to December 2008. Robust
t−statistics in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The details of data sources and variable
definitions are in the appendix.
Panel A: Short Interest and Loan Quantity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ IO ∆ ln(1+IO) Odds Buy ∆ IO ∆ ln(1+IO) Odds Buy
Fee increase 0.889*** 1.365*** 1.334*** 0.830*** 1.398*** 1.316***
(8.169) (4.888) (10.354) (7.611) (4.957) (9.833)
Short Interest -0.013 0.140** 1.001
(-0.751) (2.261) (0.187)
Loan Quantity 0.212*** -0.012 1.06***
(9.132) (-0.261) (9.484)
Observations 30,642 30,642 29,681 30,642 30,642 29,681
R2/Pseudo R2 15.17% 21.24% 3.89% 15.48% 21.19% 4.20%
Panel B: Subsample Small and Large Capitalization Stocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fee increase 0.582*** 3.337*** 1.209*** 0.953*** 0.160 1.287***
(3.389) (7.054) (3.854) (4.606) (0.387) (5.333)
Subsample Small Cap Small Cap Small Cap Large Cap Large Cap Large Cap
Observations 11,678 11,678 11,037 9,628 9,628 9,151
R2/Pseudo R2 0.174 0.233 3.39% 0.160 0.241 2.38%
Number of stocks 1,787 1,787 1,479 1,424 1,424 1,175
Table A2
Risk adjusted Return and Short Squeeze
Fama Macbeth regression explaining the Carhart (1997) 4-factor alpha with factor loadings estimated over the
prior three years using monthly data and including the level of short interest and loan quantity (Panel A). The
alphas are winsorized at 1% to minimize the impact of outliers. Panel B runs the same regression specification
for the sample of large and small stocks. A stock is classified as small cap if the market capitalization is below $2
billion, and large if the market capitalization is larger than $10 billion. The reported results are in percentages.
Stocks are classified as Specialt if they belong to the highest fee quintile. ̂Specialt is an indicator variable that
equals one if the stock is ranked as the highest predicted fee quintile. I predict the lending fee as a function of
the occurrence of a failure-to-deliver and stock characteristics like size, MTB, age, standard deviation of returns,
S&P 500 indicator, bid-ask spread, turnover, price, number of analyst, past return and whether the stock pays
dividends. The second prediction used for ̂Special2t includes proprietary information on utilization levels as
reported by Data Explorers. Controls are not reported but include ln(Mcap), bid-ask, turnover, S&P 500 (only
for the subsample of large stocks), MTB, number of analyst, dividend. Robust t−statistics in parentheses,
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The details of data sources and remaining variable definitions are in the
appendix.
Panel A: Short Interest and Loan Quantity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Buyt−1 -0.024 0.015 0.022 -0.016 0.021 0.029













Short Interest -0.023* -0.023* -0.022*
(-2.03) (-2.03) (-2.06)
Loan Quantity -2.349 -2.370* -2.085
(-1.71) (-1.78) (-1.60)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 62,010 62,010 62,010 62,010 62,010 62,010
R2 4.20% 4.18% 4.19% 4.19% 4.18% 4.17%
Continue on next page
Continued from Previous Page
Panel B: Subsample Small and Large Capitalization Stocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Buyt−1 0.049 0.154* 0.138** -0.080 -0.112** -0.097*
(0.50) (1.88) (2.16) (-1.52) (-2.21) (-1.79)
Specialt -0.444*** -0.213
(-4.06) (-1.17)










Subsample Small Small Small Large Large Large
Cap Cap Cap Cap Cap Cap
Observations 21,746 21,746 21,746 22,098 22,098 22,098
R2 3.25% 3.40% 3.45% 6.25% 6.29% 6.51%
Figure A1
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Impulse Response P95 P5
Impulse-response functions describing the reaction of the change in institutional ownership (∆ IO) to a one
standard deviation innovation in fee (Top panel, left), and the reaction of fee (Top panel, right) to a one standard
deviation innovation in the change in institutional ownership. Bottom panels impulse-response functions describe
the reaction of the change in the number of institutional owners (∆ ln(1+NIO) to a one standard deviation
innovation in fee (Bottom panel, left), and the reaction of fee (Bottom panel, right) to a one standard deviation
innovation in the change in the number of institutions. The impulse-response functions follow from a first-order
VAR model specification and fund and period-specific fixed effects. The details of data sources and variable
definitions are in the appendix.
